By Chola Mukanga
“One of
the challenges we face…is the intimidation of police officers…. some officers
are threatened with dismissals and this makes it difficult for them to perform
their duties effectively”
Those are the words of Inspector General of Police (IGP) Francis
Kabonde[i] when he appeared
before the Parliamentary Committee on
Legal Affairs earlier this year. Kabonde should know a thing or two about
intimidation because he presided over the Mufumbwe violence[ii].
A bleak chapter in our recent past now best remembered for the spectacle of Kabonde
running for his life in fear of Movement
for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) cadres. Though the blame can be laid at his
door, Mwanangombe is right to note that Kabonde’s woes reflect the political predicament
of every IGP since 1991, not least his predecessor Mateyo: "In Lusaka
two days before the by-election that picked Rupiah Banda (MMD) as president of
Zambia, Mateyo decided to set aside areas to enable all political leaders in
the election to have their rallies simultaneously.....This arrangement did not
please the MMD, as it allegedly split the attention of voters. After Banda won
the vote Mateyo was promptly out of a job, under the pretext that he was going
abroad as a diplomat. He is still languishing in Lusaka
At the heart of any approach towards better public safety is the
capacity of the policing authorities to fulfil their constitutional duties.
Understood dynamically, this “capacity” is inherently institutional and depends
heavily on the extent to which the policing authorities can genuinely fulfil
their given responsibilities under the law. This in turn depends on how much
operational freedom the constitution gives them to fulfil those duties. Without
operational independence the police are effectively reduced to being a toy of
political leaders whose overriding desire is to remain in office. Kabonde and
Mwanangombe’s assessments, though from different angles, appears to suggest that
this is the state of play in Zambia. More importantly it is not ideal.
A feudal lord with corrupt knights
Under the current constitutional arrangement the President
appoints the IGP, Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of Police. These
officers serve at the President’s pleasure. The IGP has, subject to the orders
and directions of the President, superintendence, direction and control of the
Force. The President also has powers to determine the numbers of the various
ranks within the police as he sees fit. There is no security of tenure for the
IGP and other senior officers. This explains why the job of IGP has changed so
many hands since 1991. The President exercises significant de-facto control. It
really does not matter whether Mr Mateyo or Mr Kabonde is in charge the
President to all intents and purposes runs the police force. It is no different
from how barons in Middle Ages Europe used to run fiefdoms with their knights.
Supporters of the status quo would contend that the current
framework exists to “guarantee security” by ensuring the President has his man,
after all he is the Commander in Chief. There are suggestions among some partial
observers that the precarious nature of our nation does not lend itself to an
independent police force. This argument should not be entertained because we
may as well ensure all branches of government are made up of the President and
his relatives. That way we would really ensure that all was well. But no one
would accept that because it is folly. More
importantly such simplistic defence of the status quo ignores the interplay
between weak appointing rules and other elements of governance. In particular,
without clear incentive structures it becomes difficult to address a serious
monster that lies in Kabonde’s organisation, namely corruption.
Police corruption is rife and a large reason is
lack of publicly accountability from the top commanding structure. This should
worry us because economic intuition suggests that while corruption may have
some detrimental effects on growth, it’s likely that the severity of impacts
would vary by the type of corruption. Not all corruption is the same and given
the limited resources available to government, the appropriate policy response
is to focus on those areas of corruption which may be more harmful in terms of
growth and equity.
Corruption in the police has strong negative impact
on our society for two reasons. First, it
usually hits the poor twice. Police corruption represents an instance where
poor people pay bribes in connection with misfortune or adverse events they
experience, with the consequence that the expense and possible disutility of
bribery compound the original problem. The central point is that misfortune or
adverse events can lead an individual or household to bribe simply by
increasing their need for police service. For example, victims of crime will
want to report the crime to the police, an act that may require a bribe to
ensure police cooperation. The magnitude of the effect would depend not only on
the severity of the problem, but also the degree of police corruption when
victims seek police support.
Secondly, police
corruption is damaging generally because it affects an institution that is
there to prevent it. Police corruption is likely to encourage corruption in
other areas, since the possibility of detection is reduced. For this reason,
many people have emphasised that any fight against corruption must begin with
eradicating corruption in the police force and the various watchdog
organisations. In many ways the current corruption in our police force is more
likely to damage the “fight against corruption” than any corruption taking
place in education or elsewhere. Criminal activity in the police sends the
wrong signal to other areas of society.
But how do we deal with all these challenges?
A new social contract
A professional and effective police force won’t be delivered
overnight, but we can make a start. A
place to begin is to move away from paranoid structures and think more
holistically on what delivers a sustainable relationship between institutions
with overlapping authority. In that vein, a better approach is to think of
policing services as based on a “social contract” between the Zambian people
and the Force. Underpinning that contract is two things. First, the Zambians
must recognise they are the managers and the police force merely exists to
serve them. Secondly, there should be clear operational independence guaranteed
to the police in exchange for clear and effective accountability on their part.
Police officers should do their work unhindered and should be well remunerated
for doing so. In turn, every citizen would expect each and every police officer
to be held to account.
As part of that broader revised social arrangement, it would be
necessary to guarantee operational independence within a new working framework.
The IGP should ideally be appointed by an independent body, such as the Parliamentary Select Committee on Home
Affairs or a service commission. This process must be done through open
competition, with opportunities for people to apply based on competence and
proven track record. Parliament can
play a quality assurance role through an enhanced ratification process[iii]. Whilst the Executive would now purely set the
targets that the police force should meet annually. At the basic level this would
focus on ensuring the police are fulfilling their duties, but perhaps more
fundamentally it ensures that in carrying out their activities the police are
not themselves above the law.
The social contract can be supported through soft reforms that do
not cost anything. A key aspect of this is the need to send a clear signal
to the members of the public that the police are not above the law and that any
crimes committed by members of the Force would be investigated and prosecuted. This
is best done by giving oversight institutions (e.g. Anti Corruption Commission) freedom to investigate the police by
decoupling these watchdogs from the Ministry
of Home Affairs and placing them solely accountable to an autonomous board or
Parliament. These institutions would have power to investigate, arrest, and
prosecute without reference to any other authority. This would send a strong
signal to the police and helps to serve as a deterrent.
Investigation of malpractice relies on
information. This principally comes from members of the public and the police
officers. On the public front, there's need to strengthen the Public
Police Complaints Authority (PPCA), the current oversight mechanism
for providing checks and balances and in theory is meant to act as deterrent to
abuse of police power and violation of people's rights. The PPCA was
established in 2003 with the power to investigate complaints from the public
against the police as well as injuries or deaths in police custody. The PPCA
submits its findings and recommendations to the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), IGP and ACC.
As an institution the PPCA has been a complete failure. Since its
establishment the PPCA has received over 800 complaints, made near 50 rulings
and dismissed only 13 officers for abuse of authority. Many people continue to
lack information on their rights and where and how to seek redress against
police brutality. As a result the PPCA has been totally inadequate in acting as
a mechanism of keeping trust between people and the police. It has been ineffective
in reducing police cruelty, torture and degrading treatment of suspects. Last
year for example, we saw unrestrained police violence with respect to
university students, something that led the IGP to apologise. Commenting on the
levels of police brutality and the debate on compensation, Charles Mulipi[iv] aptly noted that
if all people abused by the police asked for compensation, our country would be
bankrupt.
A key problem is the PPCA lack of powers to ensure that the police
comply with their recommendations. On many occasions the IGP has refused to
comply with the recommendations of the PPCA and the Authority had no power to
enforce them. This weakness means that there's no systematic or effective
framework for ensuring that police officers responsible will be brought to
justice. This in turn creates the perception in the minds of the public and
police officers that the police enjoy immunity from investigations.
Providing more human rights training to police officers, raising
the educational requirements for new officers or other reforms cannot make up
for the lack of an impartial, systematic and effective investigation into the
violation of human rights by police officers. Something more drastic is needed.
An Independent Police Complaints Authority
(IPCA) should be established to ensure proper investigation of crimes and other
violations by members of the Police Service. An independent authority would
receive citizens’ complaints, investigate them and take criminal and/or
disciplinary action against police officers found to have perpetrated
violations. To be truly effective, such an authority should have full powers
under law to deal effectively with complaints, including enabling powers to
order the release of persons held unlawfully and powers to ensure immediate
access to police dockets, statements and post mortem examination reports.
The police themselves can be a vital agent for rooting out
malpractice. Effective legal protection for whistle blowers within the police force
may encourage many officers to come forward. Whistle blowing is a "public
good" whose benefits go beyond the individual. In economic speak, the social benefits of whistle blowing are
greater than the private benefits,
hence it is underprovided. More importantly, no one is going to be a whistle
blower if the private costs outweigh the private benefits. So what we need is
the change in incentives so that police officers find it attractive or less
costly to blow the whistle. This calls for a combination of effective legal
protection and financial rewards. Recent
legislation on whistleblower is awfully inadequate to meet these challenges[v].
The reform of law should not just be restricted to whistle blowing
it must also be extended to laws relating to policing practices. There are significant
areas where legal loopholes exist with respect to the police and other
enforcement areas. A key part is that Zambia Zambia
Operational capacity
The proposed reforms would do much to ensure the police force is held
accountable while operating within a proper sphere of operational independence.
The other side is ensuring that our police have adequate resources to improve
their "operational capacity". A lack of resource capacity in many key
areas continues to undermine efficient service delivery and from the police
force’s perspective, it can be argued that the "police are not being
looked after". If we want the very best from the police we must do more to
resource them.
The FNDP Review 2006-10[vi]
reached similar conclusions: "Over the years, the working environment
and functionality of these law enforcement agencies have continued to
deteriorate. The agencies lack basic operational requisites while the housing
situation for officers has persistently been a worsening scenario.
Consequently, this has compromised the credibility and integrity of the law
enforcement officers and has resulted in low morale of officers, rendering them
less effective and efficient in the execution of their mandates."
Among the "recommendations" it made includes :
increasing funding to enable recruitment and retention the required skilled
human resources; strengthening the capacity of training institutions that
provide the human resource; undertaking a comprehensive training needs
assessment with a view to determining the extent of human resource needs for
the sector ; reviewing the curriculum for the different levels of training;
and, review the conditions of service with a view to improve the morale of personnel.
These are perfectly legitimate ideas which can be distilled into three specific
categories for action.
First, more man power. There are currently only 13,000 police officers
throughout the country. This is half of what is thought to be the ideal figure.
The figure has remained static in recent years. The FNDP Review[vii] noted that
accessibility to the policy had actually reduced in recent years: "For
the year 2008, the staff ratio to the appropriate population in the Zambia
Secondly, more training.
We need to provide more training to police officers. Professional training
should include modules on accountability and public trust. Induction programmes
should focus on what it means to be a police officer in a democratic society,
with special emphasis on policing by consent. Training can be provided through
existing institutions such as National
Institute of Public Administration.
Finally, more and targeted resourcing. This could take many forms
and would require learning from other countries. For example, it might be good
to have a government research centre on corruption sponsored by the ACC. We can
also set up a UNZA / Government collaboration research programme on corruption.
Such a research facility or Criminal Justice Inspectorate can be established to
provide regular reports to Parliament on the state of policing and criminal
justice system in the country. We may also consider establishing a modern
forensics laboratory. Expertise from the Diaspora to help for many of these
initiatives, to help minimise resourcing pressures.
The question of resourcing of course brings the "how question" given
the limited resources. Many of the reforms we have suggested are not costly and
can be provided at minimal cost. Improving operational capacity will involve
target spending and may require more focused police budgeting. However it
should be clear that our collective willingness to spend on law and order depends
on the value Zambians place on it. It is a view of many that law and order is
paramount and therefore resources must be found. The number one role of government
is to keep the public safe and secure. If as a nation we kept to our original
budgetary commitments set out in the development plans, there would be
sufficient funding to ensure the police are being looked after. Unfortunately
this is not the case. The FNDP allocated K371bn for 2006-10, in practice only
K125bn (or 33%) was released. It appears that the problem is the political will
to carry through what we already know.
Chola Mukanga is the founder of Zambian Economist which provides
independent and non-partisan perspectives on Zambia's progress towards
meaningful development for her people.
Copyright: Zambian Economist, 2011
[i] Florence Bupe, Kabonde
complains of political intrusion, (The Post) http://www.postzambia.com/post-read_article.php?articleId=17911
[ii] Lewis Mwanangombe,
Violence Threatens Polls, (IPS) http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=49731
[iii] Zambian Economist, Constitution
of Zambia (Amendment) Bill 2010: Part IV (Ratification Process) http://www.zambian-economist.com/2011/01/constitution-of-zambia-amendment-bill_10.html
. This piece has argues the process suffers from a well established problem in
economics called “chain store paradox”.
[v]
http://www.zambian-economist.com/2010/03/public-interest-disclosure-bill-2010.html
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